











Some novel implications of replacement and scrapping 
By 




The emphasis of capital theory in recent decades has moved away from the 
implications of useful life as an important economic variable and has turned on the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic consequences of investment irreversibilities. 
Thus the voluminous literature that has developed ignores the marked difference be-
tween replacement and scrapping and glosses over their significant implications for 
microeconomic and aggregate dynamics. This paper highlights the gains in explana-
tory power that result when useful life, replacement and scrapping are placed in the 
center of the analysis. It does so by considering an economy with two representative 
firms that differ only in that the one applies replacement and the other scrapping. 
Among other interesting findings, at the microeconomic level it turns out that the de-
mand for replacement investment is not invariant with respect to the type of capital 
policy being applied, whereas at the macroeconomic level it is shown that we cannot 
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1.  Introduction 
  Capital goods last for many years. So building a new piece of structure or 
equipment has fundamental intertemporal implications, the study of which has been 
as old as modern economics. In the early phase, Böhm-bawerk (1888) and Wicksell 
(1893) shed some light by focusing on elementary point-input point-output cases in 
which all capital took the form of goods in process (circulating capital). In the second 
phase, initially Wicksell (1923) and Åkerman (1923) demonstrated how it was possi-
ble to optimize the useful life of fixed capital in the absence of technological change 
and later Hayek (1939) drew on their results to propose a theory of business cycles. 
Then, in the third phase, Blitz (1958) and Westfield (1958) showed how optimal capi-
tal longevity or durability or service life could be computed and what was its impor-
tance for economic development. However, in the current phase, which begun with 
the seminal paper by Arrow (1968), with a few exceptions the emphasis has moved 
away from the implications of useful life as an important economic variable and has 
turned on the microeconomic and macroeconomic consequences of investment irre-
versibilities. As a result, the voluminous literature that has developed ignores the 
marked difference between replacement and scrapping, and hence it glosses over 
their significant implications for both microeconomic and aggregate dynamics.  
My objective in this paper is to demonstrate the gains in explanatory power 
when useful life, replacement and scrapping are placed in the center of economic 
analysis. For this purpose, I consider an economy with two sectors. In each sector 
there operates a single firm facing a downward sloping demand curve. Technological 
progress is embodied and proceeds at a constant exogenous rate, so that the pro-
ductivity of more recent vintages of capital increases at the same rate. In view of the 
latter condition, the two firms price their products so as to fend off competition from 
other firms that might attempt to enter by taking advantage of the higher productivity 
of newer equipment. Moreover, and most importantly, the two firms differ in their 
capital policies in that the one applies replacement and the other scrapping.  
The results that emerge are quite novel. At the microeconomic level it is found 
that the useful life of capital under scrapping is always higher than under replace-
ment. From this it follows that in the steady state the capital-scrapping firm, if in op-
eration, renews a smaller proportion of its durables relative to the capital-replacing   3
firm, and thus establishes that the demand for replacement investment is not invari-
ant with respect to the type of capital policy being applied. Another result is that un-
der scrapping the useful life of capital depends on the price elasticity of demand for 
output. So scrapping acts as a channel through which shifts in market demand in-
duce capital adjustments. Still another result is that, as the price elasticity of demand 
for output tends to infinity, the higher useful life under scrapping converges to the 
lower useful life under replacement, thus highlighting the existence of a direct link be-
tween market structure, capital policy and useful life.  
Turning to the macroeconomic level of analysis, it emerges that, as the policies of 
replacement and scrapping give rise to different useful lives, it becomes impossible to 
obtain consistent aggregates of capital stock and replacement investment.
1 Under the 
established approach this problem is ignored and the respective variables are computed 
by adding up estimates of the undepreciated values of the various classes of durables. 
These approximations are inconsistent and leave much to be desired. On the contrary, 
by adopting the approximation first suggested by Haavelmo (1960) this study allows for 
the time dimension of capital, and hence it leads to surrogates of these variables with 
less measurement errors. Another novel finding is that what the scrapping firm does re-
garding its place in the business depends on the value of the parameters, and particu-
larly those of the interest rate and the price elasticity of demand for output. If the pa-
rameters are such that operating profits are larger than capital losses, the scrapping firm 
enters and stays in the industry. But if the parameters change so that operating profits 
fall short of capital losses, the scrapping firm exits and loses the undepreciated part of its 
capital. Even though it is derived from a different approach, it is worth noting that this 
finding corroborates the evidence discovered by Veracierto (2002), according to which 
investment irreversibilities arise from an increase in the effective depreciation of capital.  
Last, but not least, the results show that, given the interest rates that were observed in 
the United states during the 1949-1968 period, if the price elasticity of demand for output 
is allowed to adjust appropriately, the model tracks very well the replacement data used 
by Feldstein and Foot (1971) and Eisner (1972).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and 
highlights its microeconomic and macroeconomic properties. Some comments regarding 
                                            
1  This impossibility is long known and goes back to the great debates in the 1950s and 1960 regarding the role of 
capital as a factor of production. Simply put, it arises because the various classes of durables cannot be trans-
formed into durables of some standard durability.   4
the definitions adopted for the construction of certain key macroeconomic variables are 
also found in the same place. In Section 3 the analysis focuses on the microeconomic and 
aggregate dynamics of the model. More specifically, initially it traces the responses of the 
main variables to a once and for all change in the interest rate and the price elasticity of 
demand for output by scrapping firms, and then it attempts to replicate the replacement 
data in the manufacturing sector of the United States from 1949 to 1968. Finally, Section 4 
summarizes the conclusions and offers a few suggestions for further research.  
 
2. The model 
Consider an economy with two firms and any number of workers. Each firm con-
sists of two lines of production, one constructing an intermediate good called capital 
solely by means of labor and another producing a final good by combining each unit of 
capital with a fixed number of workers. Let firm X produce electricity, i.e. a necessity, 
and firm Y produce tennis rackets, i.e. a luxury. In year  , firm  υ X uses   units of 
capital, measured in megawatts, whereas firm Y employs a lathe capable of cutting 
 thousand rackets per year. Usage does not wear capital because its effects are 
exactly offset by maintenance. But  and   lose constantly value because, to 
protect their markets from new entrants, firms price the goods produced with them so as 
to transfer all benefits from technological progress to consumers. Finally, assume that 
while firm X conducts business as if its monopoly will last forever, firm Y plans to exit at 
the end of the useful life of the lathe and re-enter if the prevailing market conditions at 
that time warrant it. The question that I want to investigate is whether the difference in 
the behavior of the two firms regarding the outlook of re-investment opportunities has 
important implications for the economy. To this end we proceed as follows.  
X K( ) υ
υ Y K( )
X K( ) υ υ Y K( )
 
2.1  Microeconomics 
Since in the economy under consideration there are two firms, which behave 




Assume that firm X faces a demand curve of the constant elasticity type:  
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In this equation   stands for output in year  ,   denotes a multiplicative con-
stant,  is the price of output, and  . 
X() υ υ X N () υ
X P () υ 1,  0,   >0,  0 XX XNP <− >> () () () X η υυ υ
During year   the firm uses ) υ  units of capital, all of which are equally 
productive because they embody the same technology. Hence
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defines the productivity of equipment,   being the capital-output coefficient.   () b υ
Capital built after year   is expected to be more productive because of technologi-
cal progress. So to allow for this consideration we set: 
υ
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where   and   is the economy wide rate of technological progress.  , <0, t < υ µ µ
  Next, regarding the minimum amount of labor required to built a unit of electricity 
generating capacity, we assume that: 
 




where  and  . This implies that the minimum labor required to build a unit 
of capital embodying the new technology exceeds that required to build a unit of capital 
from older vintages. 
0> 0 X M() <- 1 γ
    Finally, let the service life of electric generators be  , so that   is kept in op-
eration for the time interval  . But during these years other firms may enter 
the market by purchasing newer, and hence more productive, generators. So to fend off po-
tential competition firm   reduces prices at the rate of technological progress by setting:  
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Drawing on the above it can be shown that, if the salvage value of equipment on 
retirement is zero, the net worth of a unit of new capital at υ  is given by:  = 0
























,     (6) 
where w and σ denote respectively the economy wide rates of wages and interest. 
 Firm  X  behaves as if its monopoly will last forever. This implies that at any pe-
riod it must have no more and no less than the necessary generating capacity to meet 
the demand for electricity. For if it has less it will be losing sales and if it has more it will 
be wasting resources. As a result, it is led to maximize the present value of profits from 
an infinite series of equidistant replacements given by:  
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Equation (9) does not permit an explicit solution for T . However, it can be established 
that one and only one positive solution for T  exists.  
X
X
To sketch the proof, consider Figure 1 below. Setting T 0 X = , we see that the 
left-hand side of (9) turns into  . Next, letting T  rise above zero and taking the de- −µ σ X  7
rivative, we can ascertain that the left-hand side of (9) rises without bound with rising  . 
These findings are depicted by the upward sloping curve  . Finally, looking at the 
right-hand side of (9), observe that it defines a horizontal line, which cuts the vertical axis 
above the value  . Therefore, curve  is bound to cut the horizontal line just 
once, giving the optimal service life  .  
X T
X g(T )
−µ σ X g(T )
*
X T
At this point it will prove useful for the analysis later on to find the direction of 
change of optimal useful life as the parameters in (9) change. For this purpose, taking 
the partial derivatives we ascertain that  . 
These imply that the optimal useful life of durable producers’ goods is longer the 
higher the interest rate, the slower is technological progress, and the costlier is their 
construction cost in terms of the minimum required labor to built a single unit. Intui-
tively, these results make sense since: The costlier the producers’ goods and the 
higher the interest rate, the more urgent it becomes to save capital cost by lengthen-
ing their useful life. Also, the slower the technological progress, the less difference 
between the efficiencies of producers’ goods of consecutive vintages, and hence the 
lower the pressure of retirement. 
** * /0 ,  /0   / XX X TT T ∂∂ > ∂∂ > ∂∂ > МЖ and  0 Ќ
Introducing   and (4) into (8) and using the resulting expression in conjunction 
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From (10) and (11) we observe that both the net present unit value   and the quan-
tity  of physical capital depend also on  . But from (9) we know that   depends 
in turn on the capital policy adopted by the firm. Consequently, under a policy of equidis-
tant replacements the construction cost and the market value of the surviving cost of capi-
tal employed by firmX  would be respectively   and  .  
* 0
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Firm Y . 
  Now let me turn to Firm Y . As I said in the introduction this firm plans to exit at 
the end of the useful life of the lathe and re-enter if market conditions warrant it. So, as-
suming again that the value of the lathe on retirement is zero, firm Y maximizes:  
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with respect to   and  . In this expression it should be observed that the parame-
ter  of minimum required labor to build a unit of lathe capacity is the same as that in 
equation (4). This implies that: 
Y T 0 Y P( )
β
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γ β = .                                                          (4′) 
 
The rational for this assumption is that the minimum required labor to build a unit of pro-
ductive capacity should be the same across firms, because differences in productivity in 
their capital building departments would tend to vanish through competitive reallocation of 
workers among firms.   
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Looking at equation (14) we observe that, as   goes to zero, the left-hand side 
turns into  . Hence, both   and   start from the same point on the verti-
cal axis in Figure 1. Next let   rise above zero and take the derivative of  . As   
rises without bound, this derivative remains positive, which means that   always 
rises. Then the question is whether   rises to the left or to the right of  . Com-
paring the derivatives of the left-hand sides of equations (9) and (14) we can establish that 
rises always to the right of  . This implies in turn that   will cut the horizon-
Y T
− σ µ X g(T ) Y h(T )
Y T Y h(T ) Y T
Y h(T )
Y h(T ) X g(T )
Y h(T ) X g(T ) Y h(T )  9
tal line F  to the right of  , say at  , so the optimal service life of the lathe will be longer. 
Therefore, since in the absence of parameter changes firm Y will find it profitable to exit 
from and re-enter into its market every  , the stationary values for   and   
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From these we surmise that, once we find the optimal useful life of the lathe  , the 
other two key variables, i.e. the net present unit value   and the stock of physical 
capital  , are fully determined. 
*
Y T
* 0 Y n( )
* 0 Y K()
  Finally, notice that in the absence of parameter changes the expenditures for re-
























β =  .                                                      (18) 
 
2.2 Macroeconomics 
  Let us turn now from microeconomics to macroeconomics. Since the two firms 
produce their goods by means of different equipment, the question that arises is how to 
define and measure the capital employed in the economy. If electricity generators and 
lathes were perishable goods like lemons and oranges, the answer would be very easy.   10
Simply, we would multiply for each price times quantity and we would sum the results to 
compute their aggregate value in the economy. But this approach is untenable under the 
present circumstances because the amount of durables employed in the economy is de-
termined by two variables, i.e. quantity and useful live. Hence, we must devise a differ-
ent approach. 
  According to Haavelmo (1960, pp. 95-102), in the absence of technological 
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where the new symbol  is the undepreciated purchase cost of aggregate capital in 
the economy. The rationale of this formulation is that the multiplication of  by the 
indicated ratio adjusts it to the same useful life as  , and hence  becomes a 
measure of the aggregate capital stock of standard durability. However, observe that 
since the difference in capital policies leads to  , the proposed adjustment results 
always in underestimation of the capital stock at the individual level of firm Y. For this 
reason, this procedure should be considered a rough approximation, but certainly an 
improvement over the customary, yet unfounded method of measuring  simply as 
.  
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  Finally, in the light of the preceding adjustment, the expenditure for aggregate re-
placement investment,  , is given by: 
r I
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3. Responses of equilibrium solutions to changes in key parameters 
Assume that the parameters in the problem take the following values: 
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Solving first equations (9) and (14), we obtain the equilibrium values for   and  . 
Then introducing these values into the equations of the model, there emerges the follow-
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where all capital and replacement investment related variables are expressed in con-
struction cost prices.   From this solution it can be observed that the Haavelmo approxi-
mation to aggregate capital and replacement investment is very successful since   
and   come extremely close to the sum of the underlying microeconomic variables 
and the useful life of aggregate capital is  periods. Of course, as long as 
the parameters remain fixed, the two firms and the economy will continue to be in sta-
tionary equilibrium. 
* 0 K( )
* 0 I( )
* 0 = 31.48
X T( )
  Now let us investigate what happens to the equilibrium solution, if we allow the 
interest rate to take on different values. The results from this experiment are shown in 
Spreadsheet 1 and the associated graphs in Figure 1. Looking at the values of   
and  , we observe that, when the interest rate rises above 12.5%, both variables 
become nearly zero. This implies that the scraping firm leaves the industry of tennis 
rackets and takes a charge for the cost of the undepreciated value of capital stock. 
However, observe that at this particular level of the interest rate the net present unit 
value of capital continues to be positive, meaning that if the firm remained in business it 
would realize some operating profits. So the question is why does it decide to close 
down. The answer is that, since the firm must balance constantly the operating results 
with the results on capital account, it cannot afford to stay in business because the rise 
in the interest rate renders capital loses higher than operating profits. This is exactly the 





  In the next experiment the interest rate and the price elasticity of demand for ten-
nis rackets were allowed to change independently by certain steps. In particular, the said 
price elasticity was assumed to change in the same direction with the interest rate on the 
presumption that, as the interest rate increases, the economic conditions worsen, thus   12
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raising the price elasticity of demand for tennis rackets and slowing down the pur-
chasing of luxuries. The graphs in Figure 2 report the results for this experiment. 
From them it turns out that, as the elasticity of demand for tennis rackets increases,   13
the adverse effects of the rising interest rate are strengthened, so Firm Y is forced to 
quit from the industry earlier. Why may this finding reveal a genuine effect of shifting 
output demand on the capital decisions of the scrapping firm is not difficult to explain. 
This happens because with the increasing price elasticity of demand for tennis 
rackets the marginal revenue declines faster than if the demand curve remained sta-
ble. This hurts the profitability of the scraping firm and precipitates its exit. So, 
whereas in the absence of shifts in demand for tennis rackets the firm would quit the 
industry at an interest rate of 12.5%, now with the shifting demand the scrapping firm 
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is forced to quit at an interest rate of 9%.  
From the joint graphs of   it is also worth observing that as the price 
elasticity of demand for tennis rackets increases going to minus infinity, the useful life 
of capital under scrapping converges to the useful life of capital under replacement. 
In particular, from the following proof: 
*
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we may surmise that, even if the market for tennis rackets became perfectly competitive, 
in which case the useful lives of the two types of capital would become identical, the dif-
ferences in microeconomic and macroeconomic dynamics due to the differences in 
replacement and scrapping would still continue to exist.   
  The last experiment was design to shed light on the following question. Assume 
that a change in the interest rate alters the price elasticity of demand for output produced 
by scrapping firms in the same direction. According to the preceding analysis, such a 
change would affect the useful age of capital in the respective activities and filter through 
to the aggregate replacement investment and capital stock. So, given an actual economy, 
to what extent changes in   caused by changes in the interest rate might be responsible 
for the variation observed in the replacement investment capital stock ratio? To highlight it 
I employed the data reported by Feldstein and Foot (1971) and Eisner (1972) for U. S 
Manufacturing during the 1949-1968 period. In particular, using the series of real 
long term interest rates in the USA during this period, in conjunction with the parame-
ter values indicated above, the computer was programmed to calculate the values 
for which brought each year the replacement investment capital stock ratio from 
the model closest to the one observed. As shown in Figure 3 at the microeconomic 
level the capital stock and the replacement investment for Firm X evolve over time 
by moving smoothly and narrowly around a flat trend. On the contrary, the same 
variables for Firm Y exhibit violent and wide variations around a flat trend, mainly 
because the shifts in   render the optimal useful life of the associated capital stock 
Y η
Y η
Y η  15
  
Figure 3: Replacement investment capital stock ratio and the explana-
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*
Y T  very volatile. Moreover, when we turn to the macroeconomic level of analysis, we 
observe that the aggregates of capital stock and replacement investment are influ-
enced predominantly by the decisions of the scrapping firm. From them we observe 
that the changes in the price elasticity of demand for output by scrapping firms are 
capable of explaining a large percentage of the variation in the observed replace-
ment investment capital stock ratio. Moreover, in order to quantify the explanatory 
power of the model, we regressed this ratio on the interest rate and the price elastic-




These establish clearly that market conditions, as measured by the price elasticity of 
demand for output by scrapping firms, constitute a key determinant of replacement in-
vestment to capital stock ratio. Also they suggest that by focusing on scrapping rather 
than replacement we may be able to understand better the way in which capacity ad-
justments at the plant level influence the macroeconomic dynamics of investment.  In 
this regard it may be useful to recall the business-cycle model proposed by Hayek 
(1939). His intuition was that during a period of prosperity eventually it becomes prof-
itable for firms to decrease the capital intensity (durability) of their operations by 
switching their orders from heavy to less durable equipment.  In turn, this switching of 
orders causes financial difficulties to heavy-equipment manufacturers, which by 
spreading throughout the economy bring about recession. So, if instead of linking this 
effect to prices a la Hayek, we assume that as prosperity advances the interest rate 
and the elasticity of demand decline, what we would expect to observe according to 
the model would be an increase in average durability, and hence a decline in the re-
placement investment capital stock ratio. But then, after the interest rate and the 
price elasticity of demand start to climb, due to Hayek’s effect average durability be-
gins to decline and the replacement investment capital stock ratio to rise, thus push-
ing the economy into recession. This sequence of events is nicely corroborated by 
the results of the regression, which show a statistically significant negative relation-
ship between the replacement investment capital stock ratio, on the one hand, and 
the interest rate and the price elasticity of demand on the other.     17
4. Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
Observe that the price elasticity of output demand is present in (14) but absent 
from (9). This implies that changes in market conditions introduced through changes 
in   would affect service lives under scrapping but not under replacement. To high-
light the importance of this finding for microeconomic and aggregate dynamics of re-
placement of investment, a general equilibrium model was proposed in which firms 
are of two types: one operating under replacement and another operating under 
scrapping. From its solution there emerged three main results. The first of them is 
that the useful life of capital under scrapping is always higher than that under re-
placement. The second is that the differences in useful lives under replacement and 
under scrapping make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to construct economy-
wide aggregates for replacement investment and capital stock. And last, but not 
least, the third finding is that, whereas scrapping under perfect competition leads to 
the same useful life as under replacement, the differences of the two capital policies 
at the macroeconomic level continue to be significant. 
Y η
Moreover, the model was solved numerically in order to investigate the properties 
of equilibrium solutions to changes in certain key parameters. The results from one ex-
periment showed that, when the interest rate rises above a certain level, the scrapping 
firm exits form its industry and absorbs the losses due to the early abandonment of the 
undepreciated value of its capital stock. This corroborates the finding by Veracierto 
(2002) regarding the channel through which investment irreversibility affects capital poli-
cies. Another experiment showed that, if in addition to interest rate, the price elasticity of 
demand for output produced by the scrapping firm shifts in the same direction, the exit of 
the scrapping firm from its industry occurs at an even lower rate of interest. Finally, in a 
third experiment, I employed the data reported in Feldstein and Foot (1971) and Eisner 
(1972) to check on the ability of the model to explain the replacement investment capital 
stock ratio in U. S. Manufacturing from 1949 to 1968.  From the results it emerged that, if 
the price elasticity of demand for output by scrapping firms is computed so as to bring 
the computed value of this ratio as close as possible to the one observed, the proposed 
model demonstrates significant explanatory power. 
In light of the above analytical and computational results, several extensions ap-
pear to be in order. One such extension is to compare the implications of replacement 
and scrapping in the framework of a real business cycle model. Another important one   18
would be to investigate the consistency of aggregate capital series used in growth ac-
counting. For if the differences in the useful lives of various categories of real assets are 
not allowed for properly, this series may be beset by measurement errors of unknown 
magnitudes and directions. Still another extension would be to embed scrapping in em-
pirical models of investment and contrast their properties to conventional type models 
involving steady state replacement.  
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